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We derive a proof of security for the Differential Phase Shift Quantum Key Distribution (DP-
SQKD) protocol under the assumption that Eve is restricted to individual attacks. The security
proof is derived by bounding the average collision probability, which leads directly to a bound on
Eve’s mutual information on the final key. The security proof applies to realistic sources based
on pulsed coherent light. We then compare individual attacks to sequential attacks and show that
individual attacks are more powerful.
PACS numbers: Valid PACS appear here
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of quantum cryptography is to exchange an
unconditionally secure secret key over a potentially hos-
tile environment. To date, a variety of protocols have
been proposed to accomplish this goal. The first of
these protocols was originally proposed by Bennett and
Brassard (BB84) [1]. Since that ground-breaking re-
sult, a variety of additional protocols have been pro-
posed [2, 3, 4, 5, 6], with varying advantages and dis-
advantages.
One of the more recent protocols is known as Differen-
tial Phase Shift Quantum Key Distribution (DPSQKD
for short) [7]. This protocol appears to have several im-
portant advantages which make it extremely promising
for practical systems. First, DPSQKD can be easily im-
plemented in optical fibers using readily available optical
telecommunication tools. Second, there is good indica-
tion that DPSQKD is largely insensitive to multiphoton
states generated by the source, as opposed to other pro-
tocols such as BB84. This allows the communicating par-
ties to transmit much brighter coherent states, leading to
higher communication rates and longer communication
distances.
To date, all security statements about DPSQKD have
been based on considering only very restricted types of
eavesdropping attacks, such as intercept and resend or in-
serting a beamsplitter. This leads to the possibility that
more sophisticated attacks based on generalized quantum
measurements may exist which could potentially nullify
many of the advantages of DPSQKD. Thus, it is impor-
tant to have a security proof for this protocol which works
for a more general class of attacks. Furthermore, because
robustness to photon splitting attacks is one of the main
features of this protocol, it is important that the proof
of security includes these types of attacks.
The most general attacks that one may consider in
quantum cryptography are known as coherent or joint
attacks. In these types of attacks Eve treats the entire
key as a single quantum system, which is entangled with
a probe state. The probe is only measured after all clas-
sical information is exchanged. Coherent attacks allow
Eve to take advantage of correlations induced by clas-
sical information exchanged during error correction and
privacy amplification. The proof of security against co-
herent attacks is extremely difficult. To date, there are
several proofs of security for the BB84 protocol against
these most general types of attacks [8, 9]. A general
security proof for the B92 [4] protocol has also been de-
rived [10]. In order to make the problem more tractable,
one often restricts eavesdropping to individual attacks.
In these types of attacks, it is assumed that Eve attaches
an independent probe to each photon, and then mea-
sures the probes independently. The security of BB84
against individual attacks has been investigated in sev-
eral works [11, 12, 13]. The security of the B92 proto-
col against individual attacks has also been proven [14].
The restriction to individual attacks is often considered
a realistic assumption because the capability to perform
joint attacks is well beyond the domain of modern tech-
nology. Such attacks would require that an eavesdropper
possess a probe of extremely large dimensionality (on the
order of the length of the string) with indefinite coher-
ence time, and process the probe states with a quantum
computer. Even individual attacks require a degree of
quantum computational power which seems out of reach
for the foreseeable future.
In this paper, we derive a proof of security for DP-
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FIG. 1: A basic DPSQKD system.
SQKD against individual attacks. The proof applies
to realistic sources based on attenuated lasers, and ac-
counts for the poisson nature of the photon statistics in-
jected into the channel. Security is proved by deriving
a bound on Eve’s average collision probability, which di-
rectly leads to a bound on her mutual information for the
final key [15]. We use this result to calculate the commu-
nication rate of DPSQKD in the limit of large strings. We
then compare this rate to that of BB84 using both single
photon sources and poisson light sources. We show that
DPSQKD achieves rates very close to BB84 with an ideal
single photon source, and significantly outperforms BB84
with poisson light. This is an important result because
DPSQKD requires only attenuated laser light and linear
optics, in contrast to single photon sources which are dif-
ficult to implement. In the final section of this paper,
we consider another type of eavesdropping attack known
as a sequential attack. These types of attacks are not
individual attacks, so they are not accounted for by our
proof of security. However, they are conceptually simple
and have raised a level of concern regarding the secu-
rity of DPSQKD. We calculate the communication rate
against these types of attacks and compare it to the rate
for individual attacks. It turns out that in our parameter
range of interest, the communication rate for individual
attacks is always lower than sequential attacks. Thus
security against individual attacks automatically implies
security against sequential attacks.
II. DIFFERENTIAL PHASE SHIFT QKD
Figure 1 shows the basic idea behind DPSQKD. Al-
ice prepares a periodic train of attenuated laser pulses
whose phase is randomly modulated to be 0 or π. The
coherent pulses are sent down the quantum channel and
received by Bob, who measures them using an unbal-
anced interferometer which combines the partial wave at
time slot n with time slot n+1 on a beamsplitter. If the
phase difference between these two pulses is 0, a detec-
tion event will only occur in detectorD0. Similarly, if the
phase difference is ±π, detection events will only occur
in detector D1. Bob records the detection events and the
times they occurred at. Once the quantum communica-
tion is done, Bob announces at which times he detected a
photon. This information allows Eve to determine Bob’s
string based on her knowledge of the phase differences.
Error correction and privacy amplification can then be
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FIG. 2: Schematic of intercept-resend and beamsplitter eaves-
dropping strategies.
performed on the sifted key to create the final secure
key.
To get an idea as to why this protocol is secure, lets
consider some simple attacks Eve might try to perform.
Two basic attacks are shown in Figure 2. The first at-
tack is an intercept and resend strategy, in which Eve
uses the same type of interferometer as Bob. When Eve
gets a detection event time tm, she learns the phase dif-
ference between the pulses at time tm and tm+1. She then
prepares a pair of pulses with the measured phase differ-
ence and sends them to Bob. If Bob detects a photon at
time tm, then Eve has successfully stolen a bit without
inducing errors. However, if a detection instead occurs
at times tm+1 or tm−1, then Bob will observe a 50% er-
ror rate, and Eve will have no knowledge about that bit
of the key. This strategy therefore induces a 25% over-
all error rate which can be detected by Alice and Bob,
revealing Eve’s presence.
In the second strategy, Eve inserts a beamsplitter into
the channel to pull of a fraction of the light. This split
off fraction is then measured by an unbalanced interfer-
ometer, while the remainder is sent to Bob. We assume
Eve posses a lossless channel with which she can trans-
mit the un-split photons to Bob. This allows her to split
off a fraction of the photons equal to the channel loss
without modifying the communication rate. Because co-
herent states are being used, Eve’s detection events are
independent of Bob’s. Thus, the probability that Eve
knows the value of a bit at time m given Bob detected a
photon at that time, denoted pe(m), is simply given by
psplit(m) = n¯ (1− η) ≈ n¯ (1)
where n¯ is the average number of photons per pulse. For
small values of n¯, this attack provides little information
about the sifted key. If Eve delays her measurement and
uses an optical switch, she can improve the attack a factor
of 2.
3III. PHOTON SPLITTING IN DPSQKD
In this section we lay the groundwork for the proof of
security. We start by giving a mathematical description
of individual attacks. We then investigate photon split-
ting attacks in DPSQKD. The state prepared by Alice,
denote |ψ〉, is a set of consecutive coherent state pulses.
The phase shift φn is the phase induced by the phase
modulator on pulse n. This phase can take on the values
0 and π. If Alice transmits N coherent pulses, we have
|ψ〉 =
N−1⊗
n=0
|αei(φ+φn)〉 (2)
where φ is the initial phase of the coherent state. We
define the bosonic operator ψˆ† as
ψˆ† =
1√
N
N−1∑
n=0
eiφn aˆ†n (3)
where aˆ†n is the creation operator for a photon in time
slot n. Assuming that the time slots do not overlap, these
different operators commute with each other. Thus, the
state in Eq. 2 can be re-written as
|ψ〉 =
∞∑
j=0
√
P (j)eijφ
(
ψˆ†
)j
√
j!
|0〉 (4)
where P (j) is a poisson distribution with average photon
number Nn¯, and n¯ = |α|2. A fundamental assumption
of the DPSQKD protocol is that Eve does not possess a
phase reference. Because of this, the above state should
be averaged out over the different values of the phase φ,
resulting in the mixed state
ρe =
∞∑
j=0
P (j) |ψj〉 〈ψj | (5)
where |ψj〉 = (ψˆ†)j/
√
j!|0〉. With no loss of generality,
Eve can measure the photon number using a state pre-
serving quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement.
She can then split off Nn¯T of the photons, where T is
the transmission efficiency of the channel, and send them
to Bob, while storing Nn¯(1−T ) photons coherently to be
measured after Alice and Bob have revealed all classical
information.
There are now two components of the eavesdropping
strategy which must be addressed. The first is how
much information can be extracted from the split pho-
tons. This component is analogous to the information
obtained from photon splitting attacks in BB84. Second,
in the presence of channel noise Eve can potentially at-
tack the fraction of the key that she transmits to Bob
by entangling it with a probe state. This part of the
eavesdropping attack is analogous to the general POVM
attacks on single photon states. We will investigate the
split photon component first, and then the generalizes
POVM on the transmitted photons.
Our analysis makes an auxiliary assumption that Eve
attacks each photon individually. For the photons that
are transmitted to Bob, each one is individually split and
attached to an independent probe. The probes are then
independently measured after all classical communica-
tion is received. The split photons are also individually
stored and measured. The individual attacks assumption
implies that Eve cannot use the measurement results of
one photon to refine her measurement on the rest of the
photons. Thus, if Eve has split off k photons, she has k
copies of the state ψˆ†|0〉. Eve stores these k copies co-
herently until all public information is revealed. After
the quantum transmission is done, Bob will publicly an-
nounce the time slots in which he had a detection event.
Let B be the set of all time slots in which a detection
event was observed, and B¯ be the set of all other time
slots. The operator ψˆ† can be re-written as
ψˆ† =
1√
N

∑
m∈B
eiφm
(
aˆ
†
m + e
i∆φm
aˆ
†
m+1
)
+
∑
n∈B¯
eiφn aˆ†n

 |0〉
(6)
For each time slot in B, Eve can perform the following
unitary transformation
aˆ
†
m →
1√
2
(
0ˆ†m + 1ˆ
†
m
)
(7)
aˆ
†
m+1 →
1√
2
(
0ˆ†m − 1ˆ†m
)
(8)
where 0ˆ†m and 1ˆ
†
m are orthogonal modes. There is no
loss of generality in assuming this transformation is per-
formed, because it is unitary and simply represents a
transformation of the measurement basis. If measure-
ment basis |E〉 is optimal for the state in Eq. 6, then the
basis U †|E〉 is now optimal after the unitary transforma-
tion U is applied. The state of each split photon is now
given by
ψˆ† =
1√
N

∑
m∈B
eiφm
√
2xˆ†i +
∑
n∈B¯
eiφn aˆ†n

 (9)
where xˆ†i is 0ˆ
†
i if Alice sent a binary 0, and 1ˆ
†
i if Alice sent
1. Thus, Eve’s split photons are in a linear superposition
of all the bits of the secret key, plus the irrelevant time
slots where no photon was detected. However, because
Eve does not know the phases φm, her state is in fact a
mixture of the different values of φm. Specifically,
ρe =
∑
φ1...φk
p(φ1, . . . , φk)ψˆ
† |0〉 〈0| ψˆ
=
1
N

2 ∑
m∈B
|xm〉 〈xm|+
∑
n∈B¯
|n〉 〈n|

 (10)
4In the above equation |xm〉 = xˆ†m|0〉 and |n〉 = aˆ†n|0〉.
The phases φi are summed over the possible values
of 0 and π, which have equal probability so that
p(φ1, . . . , φk) = 1/2
k. From Eq. 10 we see that Eve’s
state is in fact a random mixture of orthogonal states.
This turns the problem into one of classical probability
theory instead of quantum measurement. That is, if Bob
recorded y detection events, each split photon will reveal
a bit of Eve’s key with probability 2y/N , and will reveal
no information at all with probability 1− 2y/N .
Let us define T as the channel transmission and n¯ as
the average number of photons per pulse. After N pulses,
Bob will observe on average Nn¯T detection events. As-
suming Eve has possession of a lossless channel, she must
transmit Nn¯T photons to Bob, and can split off the re-
mainder Nn¯(1−T ) photons to be stored coherently. Af-
ter Bob reveals the time slots of his detection events, Eve
can measure her split photons, in which case she learns
2Nn¯2T (1− T ). Thus, from the split photons Eve learns
a fraction 2n¯(1 − T ) ≈ 2n¯ of the sifted key. If n¯ = 0.1,
Eve learns only 20% of the final key.
The most important aspect of the above conclusion is
that, in contrast to BB84, the amount of information Eve
obtains from photon splitting attacks is independent of
channel loss. In BB84, as the channel losses get larger
Eve can preferentially transmit multi-photon states and
block off an appropriate fraction of the single photon
states to conserve the overall communication rate. As
the channel loss becomes larger, this type of attack gives
her complete information over an increasingly larger frac-
tion of the key. This results in a final communication rate
which is roughly a quadratic function of channel loss, and
hence decreases very quickly. In contrast, in DPSQKD
the fraction of the final key that is revealed is only a
function of n¯. This leads to a communication rate which
decreases only linearly with channel loss, indicating ro-
bustness against photon splitting attacks.
IV. PROOF OF SECURITY
In the previous section we showed that due to photon
splitting, Eve obtains complete information over a frac-
tion 2n¯ of the key. When n¯ is small, photon splitting
attacks are largely ineffective. However, in the presence
of channel noise Eve can also attack the photons that
she transmits to Bob by entangling them with a probe
state, and then measuring the probe after all classical
information has been revealed.
Because we restrict our attention to individual attacks,
it is assumed that Eve attaches an independent probe to
each photon, and these probes are all measured indepen-
dently. The goal of a proof of security is to come up with
a bound for the average collision probability [11], defined
as
Pc =
∑
x,z,m
p2(X = x|Z = z,M = m)p(z,m) (11)
where X is the key Alice transmitted to Bob, Z is the in-
formation Eve obtained from measuring the photon, and
M is the set of time slots in which Bob detected a photon,
which is also known to Eve. For the case of individual
attacks, bit i originated from one photon which is cor-
related to an independent probe state Zi, as well as Mi
which is the time of the detection. In this case, the col-
lision probability simplifies to a product of the collision
probabilities of each individual bit [16]. Thus,
Pc =
∏
i
Pc0 (12)
where
Pc0 =
∑
x,z,m
p2(Xi = x|Zi = z,Mi = m)p(Zi = z,Mi = m)
(13)
If bit i occurred in a time slot where Eve has obtained
its value due to photon splitting, then Pci = 1. Let S¯
be the set of all bits that occurred in time slots which do
not coincide with a photon splitting measurement. We
now have
Pc =
∏
i∈S¯
Pc0 (14)
We adopt a simplified notation such that P (Xi = x|Zi =
z,Mi = m) = p(x|z,m), and use similar notation for all
other probability distributions. In appendix A we show
that the expression in Eq. 13 can be re-written as
Pc0 =
∑
m
p(m)
(
1− 1
2p(m)
∑
z
p(z,m|0)p(z,m|1)
p(z,m)
)
(15)
where 0 and 1 are the possible values of the bit Alice
transmitted.
We now develop a mathematical formalism for all pos-
sible measurements Eve can perform. We define |Ei〉 as
the initial state of Eve’s hilbert space. We do not as-
sume anything about the dimensionality of this space.
The initial state of a photon-probe system is given by
|Ψ〉 = 1√
N
∑
n
eiφn |n〉|Ei〉 (16)
where |n〉 is one again defined as aˆ†n|0〉 and represents a
photon in time slot n. The most general unitary trans-
formation Eve can apply to the system is described by
|n〉|Ei〉 →
∑
m
|m〉|En,m〉 (17)
where |En,m〉 are states in Eve’s Hilbert space and are
not assumed to be normalized or orthogonal. Plugging
the above relation back into Eq. 16 and rearranging the
summation we obtain
|Ψ〉 = 1√
N
∑
m
|m〉
∑
n
eiφn |En,m〉
=
1√
N
∑
m
|m〉|Jm〉 (18)
5After Bob’s interferometer, the state is once again trans-
formed into
|Ψ〉 = 1
2
√
N
∑
m
[(|Jm〉+ |Jm+1〉) |0m〉+ (|Jm〉 − |Jm+1〉) |1m〉]
(19)
where |0m〉 and |1m〉 represent a photon in the output
ports of Bob’s interferometer which correspond to a bi-
nary 0 or 1 at time m.
In appendix B, it is shown that the probability of an
error given Bob detected a photon at time m is given by
the expression
pe|m =
1
2
[
1− 1
Np(m)
(〈Em,m| Em+1,m+1〉
+ 〈Em,m+1| Em+1,m〉)] (20)
Eve will measure her probe in the basis |z〉, which can-
not depend on φm since this information is unavailable.
We define the number En,m(z) = 〈z| En,m〉. Without
loss of generality we can assume this to be a real num-
ber. We do not need to introduce complex numbers in
this case because a probe state with a complex proba-
bility amplitude can always be replaced by a probe of
higher dimensionality with real probability amplitudes
which performs at least as well [11]. We also define the
following expressions:
Qm(z) = Em,m(z) + Em+1,m(z) (21)
Pm(z) = Em,m(z)− Em+1,m(z) (22)
Qm+1(z) = Em,m+1(z) + Em+1,m+1(z) (23)
Pm+1(z) = Em,m+1(z)− Em+1,m+1(z) (24)
In appendix C we show that the collision probability is
given by the expression
Pc0 = 1− 1
4N
∑
m,z
(
Q2m(z) +Q
2
m+1(z) +
∑
n6=m,m+1E
2
n,m + E
2
n,m+1
)(
P 2m(z) + P
2
m+1(z) +
∑
n6=m,m+1E
2
n,m + E
2
n,m+1
)
∑
nE
2
n,m + E
2
n,m+1
(25)
From the above expressions, it is clear that En,m(z)
where n 6= m − 1,m,m + 1 can only decrease Eve’s
collision probability while simultaneously increasing the
error rate. Thus, we only need to consider the states
|Em−1,m〉,|Em,m〉, and |Em+1,m〉. We relabel these states
as |Am〉, |Bm〉, and |Cm〉 respectively. We similarly define
Am(z) = 〈z| Am〉, Bm(z) = 〈z| Bm〉, Cm(z) = 〈z| Cm〉.
The probability of error is now given by
pe|m =
1
2
− 1
2Np(m)
∑
m
(〈Bm| Bm+1〉+ 〈Cm| Am+1〉)
(26)
We also have the expression
Qm(z) = Bm(z) + Cm(z) (27)
Pm(z) = Bm(z)− Cm(z) (28)
Qm+1(z) = Am+1(z) +Bm+1(z) (29)
Pm+1(z) = Am+1(z)−Bm+1(z) (30)
In appendix D it is shown that the collision probability
is upper bounded by
Pc0 ≤ 1− 1
8N
∑
m,z
(〈Am| Am〉+ 〈Cm+1| Cm+1〉
+ 〈Qm| Pm〉+ 〈Qm+1| Pm+1〉
+ 〈Qm| Pm+1〉+ 〈Qm+1| Pm〉) (31)
In appendix E we show that there is always an optimal
attacks which satisfies the property that the inner prod-
uct of the vectors |Am〉, |Bm〉, and |Cm〉 with any other
vector from this set is independent of m. This directly
implies that p(m) = 1/N and that the collision probabil-
ity is independent of m. Thus,
Pc0 ≤ 1− 1
8
∑
z
(〈A0| A0〉+ 〈C1| C1〉
+ 〈Q0| P0〉+ 〈Q1| P1〉
+ 〈Q0| P1〉+ 〈Q1| P0〉) (32)
e =
1− 〈B0| B1〉 − 〈C0| A1〉
2
(33)
where e is the bit error rate of the transmission. We must
now maximize Eq. 32 subject to the constraint in Eq. 33.
This is done in appendix F, where it is shown that
Pc0 ≤ 1− e2 − (1− 6e)
2
2
(34)
The above a equation applies when the error rate is in
the range [0, 6/38]. The point e = 6/38 is the point at
which the above equation is maximized. When the error
rate exceeds this value the collision probability saturates.
There is no attack which allows Eve to have complete
information on the key. This is in contrast to BB84 where
Eve can steal Alice’s photons and send an uncorrelated
photon to Bob. After the measurement basis is revealed,
Eve learns the bit but simultaneously induces a 50% error
rate.
Plugging the expression in Eq. 34 back into Eq. 14, we
obtain the following expression for Eve’s total collision
6probability on the k bit string,
Pc = Pc
k(1−2n¯)
0 (35)
Using the methods of generalized privacy amplification,
the length of the final key should be set to
r = − log2 Pc− κ− s (36)
where κ is the number of bits exchanged during error
correction and s is a security parameter [15]. The final
communication rate, defined as R = limk→∞ r/k, is given
by
RDPS = −pclick [− (1− 2n¯) log2 Pc0(e) + f(e)h(e)]
(37)
In the above equation pclick is the probability Bob de-
tects a photon, h(e) = −e log2 e− (1− e) log2(1− e), and
f(e) is a function which characterizes how far above the
Shannon limit the error correction algorithm is perform-
ing (see [17]). For error correction algorithms working
in the Shannon limit, which is the ultimate performance
limit of all error correction algorithms, we have f(e) = 1.
V. COMPARISON OF DPSQKD TO BB84
Having derived a bound on the average collision prob-
ability in the previous section, we can now compare DP-
SQKD to the BB84 protocol. A bound on the collision
probability for the BB84 protocol for realistic sources
against individual attacks has been previously derived
in [17]. In this work, the communication rate was shown
to be
RBB84 = pclick
[
−β log2
(
1
2
+ 2
(
e
β
)
− 2
(
e
β
)2)
−f(e)h(e)] (38)
where
β =
pclick − pm
pclick
(39)
In the above expression, pm is the probability that the
source emits a multi-photon state into the channel.
Bob’s detection events originate from two sources, the
photons injected into the channel by Alice and dark
counts in Bob’s detector. We assume that both the sig-
nal and dark count detection probabilities are small, so
that multiple detection events can be ignored. Thus,
pclick = n¯T + d (40)
where n¯ is the average number of photons injected into
the channel, T is the channel transmission, and d is the
detector dark count rate. The error rate e is given by the
expression
e =
µpclick + d/2
pclick
(41)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
10−7
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
Channel Loss (dB)
Bi
ts
 P
er
 P
ul
se
DPSQKD
BB84 − Poisson Light
BB84 − Ideal Single Photon Source
FIG. 3: Communication rate vs. channel loss for DPSQKD
and BB84.
where µ is the baseline error rate of the system due to im-
perfections in state preparation, channel induced noise,
and imperfect detection apparatus.
We compare DPSQKD to BB84 using both a Poisson
photon source and ideal single photon source. For pois-
son light sources, n¯ is freely adjustable and pm ≤ n¯2/2.
In contrast, an ideal single photon source is characterized
by n¯ = 1 and pm = 0. The detector dark count rate is
an important parameter in the simulation. For telecom
wavelengths, one of the most promising photon detec-
tors is based on up-conversion of 1.5µ photons to visible
wavelengths, where they can be detected using conven-
tional silicon APDs [18]. Such detectors have already
been used to experimentally demonstrate DPSQKD in
the telecom wavelengths, allowing communication dis-
tances over 100km of fiber [19]. The experimentally mea-
sured dark count rate for these detectors is 10kHz per
detector. The APDs have a temporal resolution of 0.5ns.
If the signal is windowed to this resolution level, the dark
count rate per pulse is 5×10−6 dark counts per detector.
Since DPSQKD uses 2 detectors, the overall dark count
rate is 10−5. In contrast, BB84 with passive modula-
tion [11] uses four detectors giving a dark count rate of
2× 10−5. The baseline error rate is set to µ = 0.01. The
parameter n¯ is freely adjustable for BB84 with poisson
light, as well as for DPSQKD. In the simulations, the
value of n¯ is numerically optimized for each value of the
channel loss.
The results of the simulation are shown in Fig. 3. The
communication rate is plotted vs. the channel loss in
units of dB. One can see that all three curves feature an
exponential decay for a period of time, after which the
communication rate quickly drops to 0. This sharp cut-
off is caused by the dark counts in Bob’s detectors. The
curve for BB84 with poisson light decays as a faster ex-
ponential than both DPSQKD and BB84 with an ideal
single photon source. This is due to photon splitting at-
tacks, which require us to lower n¯ with increasing chan-
nel loss. DPSQKD does not suffer from these types of
attacks, therefore it follows more closely the curve for
7BB84 with an ideal single photon source. This is a very
important conclusion, because DPSQKD can be imple-
mented with conventional lasers, detectors, and linear
optics, in contrast to engineering of ideal single photon
sources for BB84.
VI. SEQUENTIAL ATTACKS
In the previous two sections we investigated the secu-
rity of DPSQKD against individual attacks. The funda-
mental assumption in this analysis was that Eve mea-
sures each photon independently, and does not use the
measurement results of some of the photons to refine the
measurement of the remaining photons. However, in DP-
SQKD there are certain attacks which do not satisfy this
assumption, but which are conceptually very simple. One
such attack is the sequential attack.
In a sequential attack, Eve uses a detection apparatus
equivalent to Bob’s setup, which she places in the quan-
tum channel very close to Alice. Eve then waits for k
consecutive clicks on her detection apparatus. Whenever
such an event occurs, Eve can reconstruct a k + 1 time
slot state. This states induces an error rate of
ǫseq =
1
2(k + 1)
(42)
Off course, the probability of observing k consecutive
clicks decreases exponentially with k. If n¯ is the aver-
age number of photons per pulse, then the probability
of k consecutive clicks is n¯k. This probability must be
at least as large as Bob’s detection probability in order
for Eve to conserve the overall detection rate. Thus, we
must have n¯k ≥ n¯T , which imposes an upper bound on
k.
The collision probability for sequential attacks is very
easy to calculate. When Bob detects a photon in any
time slot other than slot 1 or k+2, Eve knows the value
of Alice’s key. This happens with probability k/(k + 1).
If Bob detects a photon in slot 1 or k+2, then Eve knows
nothing about Alice’s key, so her collision ptobability is
1/2. If Eve performs M sequential attacks, her collision
probability is given by
Pc0 =
1
2M/k+1
(43)
From the condition n¯k = n¯T we obtain that
k = logn¯ T + 1 (44)
This condition ensures that there are enough sequen-
tial clicks to conserve the communication rate. However,
even if the number of sequential clicks is sufficient, Eve
may not be able to perform an attack on every bit of the
key, because she cannot exceed the natural system error
rate which we define as ǫs. She can only perform a se-
quential attack on a fraction ǫs/ǫseq of the bits, and must
leave the remainder of the string undisturbed to conserve
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FIG. 4: Comparison of individual attacks to sequential at-
tacks in DPSQKD.
the error rate. Thus, if N is the number of bits in Alice’s
string, then
M =
Nǫs
ǫseq
= N(k + 1)ǫs (45)
Plugging the above equation into Eq. 43, and using
Eq. 36, we obtain the communication rate
Rseq = pclick [1− 2ǫs (logn¯ T + 1)− f(e)h(e)] (46)
We compare this communication rate to that of DP-
SQKD calculated in the previous section. Using the same
values for the dark count and error rate, we plot the
communication rate for sequential attacks and individ-
ual attacks in Fig. 4. For individual attacks, the average
photon number n¯ is once again optimized for each value
of the channel loss. We then use the same optimal n¯ to
evaluate the rate for sequential attacks, so that we may
compare the effectiveness of individual and sequential at-
tacks under the same operating condition. One can see
that the communication rate for individual attacks is al-
ways lower than sequential attacks, indicating that in the
operating regime we are considering it is more advanta-
geous for Eve to perform individual instead of sequential
attacks. This means that security against individual at-
tacks already implies security against sequential attacks
as well.
Off course, we do not know if the sequential attack are
optimal, or if a more clever scheme could produce better
results for Eve. To answer this question, a more general
proof of security is needed.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have derived a proof of security for
DPSQKD with realistic sources against individual at-
tacks. This proof allows us to directly calculate the com-
munication rate after privacy amplification. We showed
that, in contrast to BB84, DPSQKD does not suffer from
8photon splitting attacks even when implemented with at-
tenuated lasers. We compared the communication rate
as a function of channel loss for DPSQKD to BB84 using
both an attenuated laser and ideal single photon source.
DPSQKD allows us to achieve communication rates close
to BB84 with an ideal single photon source, making it an
outstanding candidate for practical long distance quan-
tum cryptography. We then compared individual attacks
to sequential attacks in DPSQKD and showed that indi-
vidual attacks are more powerful in our operating regime.
Thus, security against individual attacks already ensures
security against sequential attacks as well.
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MURI Center for photonic quantum information systems
(ARO/ARDA Program DAAD19-03-1-0199), as well as
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APPENDIX A: EXPRESSION FOR COLLISION
PROBABILITY
Here we derive the expression for the collision prob-
ability given in Eq. 15. We start with Eq. 13, and use
Bayes rule to rewrite it as
Pc0 =
∑
m
p(m)
∑
z
p2(z|0,m)p2(0|m) + p2(z|1,m)p2(1|m)
p(z|m)
(A1)
By completing the square, we can re-write the above ex-
pression as
Pc0 =
∑
m
p(m)
(
1− 2
∑
z
p(0)p(1)p(z,m|0)p(z,m|1)
p(z,m)p(m))
)
(A2)
Using the fact that p(0) = p(π) = 1/2 directly leads to
the result stated in Eq. 15.
APPENDIX B: DERIVATION OF THE ERROR
RATE
In this section we show that Eve’s attack strategy leads
to an error rate given by Eq. 20. We start with the
obvious relation pe,m = (pe,m|0+pe,m|1)/2. We define the
states |M+〉 = |Jm〉+ |Jm+1〉 and |M−〉 = |Jm〉− |Jm+1〉.
We define Eφ1...φk [A] as the average of expression A over
the possible values of φ1 . . . φk. It is straightforward to
show that
p(m) =
1
4N
Eφ1...φk [〈M−|M−〉+ 〈M+|M+〉]
=
1
2N
∑
n
〈En,m| En,m〉+ 〈En,m+1| En,m+1〉
Now,
pe,m|0 =
∑
φ1,...,φk
pe,m|0,φ1,...,φk
∏
j 6=m+1
p(φj)
=
∑
φ1,...,φk
pe,m|0,φ1,...,φk2
−(k−1)
=
∑
φ1,...,φk
〈M−|M−〉 2−(k−1)
=
1
4N
∑
n6=m,m+1
||En,m〉 − |En,m+1〉|2 +
| (|Em,m〉 − |Em+1,m+1〉) + (|Em+1,m〉 − |Em,m+1〉) |2
The exact same argument leads to
pe,m|0 =
1
4N
∑
n6=m,m+1
||En,m〉 − |En,m+1〉|2+
| (|Em,m〉 − |Em+1,m+1〉)− (|Em+1,m〉 − |Em,m+1〉) |2
Using the above two expressions we have
pe,m =
1
2
[
p(m)− 1
N
(〈Em,m| Em+1,m+1〉
+ 〈Em+1,m| Em,m+1〉)]
Dividing the above expression by p(m) directly leads to
the expression in Eq. 20.
APPENDIX C: EXPRESSION FOR COLLISION
PROBABILITY
Here we derive the expression in Eq. 25. We start with
the expression in Eq. 15. Using the same definition for
Eφ1...φk [A] that we did in appendix B, we have
p(z,m|0) = 1
4N
Eφ1...φk [| (〈z| Jm〉+ 〈z| Jm+1〉) |0m〉
+(〈z| Jm〉 − 〈z| Jm+1〉) |1m〉|2
]
=
1
4N
[
(Em,m(z) + Em+1,m)
2
+
(
Em,m+1(z) + E
2
m+1,m+1
)2
+
∑
n6=m,m+1
E2n,m + E
2
n,m+1


Similarly we can derive
p(z,m|1) = 1
4N
[
(Em,m(z)− Em+1,m)2
+(Em,m+1(z)− Em+1,m+1)2
+
∑
n6=m,m+1
E2n,m + E
2
n,m+1


Using the fact that p(z,m) = (p(z,m|0) + p(z,m|1))/2,
and plugging the above two expressions into Eq. 15 di-
rectly leads to the expression given in Eq. 25.
9APPENDIX D: UPPER BOUND ON COLLISION
PROBABILITY
We start with equation 25, and use the form of the
Cauchy inequality which was first proposed by Lutken-
haus for the bound on the collision probability in BB84
(see Appendix A of [11] ). Specifically if ψ(z) = 〈z| ψ〉
and φ(z) = 〈z| φ〉, then the Cauchy inequality tells us
that
∑
z
ψ2(z)φ2(z)
A2m(z) +A
2
m+1(z) +B
2
m(z) +B
2
m+1(z) + C
2
m(z) + C
2
m+1(z)
≥ 〈φ| ψ〉
2p(m)
(D1)
We expand the product terms in Eq. 25, and apply the
above bound. Also, we can assume that |Am〉 and |Cm+1〉
are orthogonal to all other vectors, because this maxi-
mizes the collision probability without affecting the er-
ror rate. This leads directly to the expression given in
Eq. 31.
APPENDIX E: SYMMETRIZATION OF
COLLISION PROBABILITY
We have so far shown that the collision probability and
error rate depend on interference between state vectors
at times m and m + 1. This means that our optimiza-
tion problem has a symmetry of circular permutation.
Specifically, if we apply the following transformation,
|Am〉 → |Am+1 mod k〉
|Bm〉 → |Bm+1 mod k〉
|Cm〉 → |Cm+1 mod k〉
we do not affect the error rate or Eve’s collision proba-
bility. Now, let us suppose that an optimal attack exists
which is given by the state vectors |Am〉, |Bm〉, and |Cm〉.
We can form a new set of state vectors |A′m〉, |B′m〉, and
|C′m〉 as follows
|A′m〉 =
1√
k
k−1∑
j=0
|Am+j mod k〉|j〉
|B′m〉 =
1√
k
k−1∑
j=0
|Bm+j mod k〉|j〉
|C′m〉 =
1√
k
k−1∑
j=0
|Cm+j mod k〉|j〉
In the above equations, |j〉 represent an orthogonal basis
which keeps track of which circular permutation has been
chosen. The collision probability can now be written as
Pc0 =
∑
x,z,m,j
p2(x|z,m, j)p(z,m, j)
=
∑
j
p(j)
∑
x,z,m
p2(x|z,m, j)p(z,m|j)
=
∑
j
p(j)Pc0|j
The expression Pc0|j is simply the average collision prob-
ability given the value of the measurement on the states
|j〉. However, because the different values of j represent
different circular permutations and the collision proba-
bility is invariant under circular permutation, we have
Pc0|j = Pc0. Thus, the symmetrized probes |A′m〉, |B′m〉,
and |C′m〉 have the same collision probability as the un-
symmetrized ones. It is easy to verify that these sym-
metrized probes satisfy the property that their inner
products with each other is independent of m.
APPENDIX F: OPTIMIZATION OF THE
COLLISION PROBABILITY
We define a = 〈A0| A0〉 = 〈A1| A1〉, b = 〈B0| B0〉 =
〈B1| B1〉, and c = 〈C0| C0〉 = 〈C1| C1〉. Normalization
imposes the constraint a+b+c = 1. We define the angles
φ1 and φ2 as
〈B1| B0〉 = b cosφ1
〈A1| C0〉 =
√
ac cosφ2
Straightforward manipulation of the bound on Pc0 leads
to the expression
Pc0 ≤ 1− 1
8
[
a2 + c2 + (b− c)2+
(b − a)2 + 2(b cosφ1 −
√
(ac) cosφ2)
]
We also use the fact that(
b cosφ1 −
√
ac cosφ2
)
= (1− 2e)2 − 4b√ac cosφ1 cosφ2
10
Using the above expression, it is easy to show that the
collision probability is maximized and the error rate is
minimized when cosφ1 = cosφ2 = 1.
Now we set
a = (1− b) cos θ
c = (1− b) sin θ
Plugging into the expression for the collision probability,
it is straightforward to show that the collision probabil-
ity achieves a maximum when θ = π/4, and that this
condition also minimizes the error rate. Thus, the opti-
mal attack strategy occurs when a = c. This condition
implies that
e =
x
2
Pc0 ≤ 1− 1
4
(
x2 + 2(1− 3x)2)
Substituting the expression for e into Pc0 directly leads
to the expression in Eq. 34.
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